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I. Introduction
In its totality , the NCAA makes up 1,117 colleges and universities, over 100 athletic
conferences, with 40 affiliated sports organizations.1 Their motto: prioritizing academics, wellbeing and fairness so college athletes can succeed on the field, in the classroom and for life. 2 Not
surprisingly, each Division has their own set of rules, called bylaws.3 Member representatives are
appointed and serve on committees within the NCAA and are responsible for proposing rules and
policies within the realm of college athletics.4 It is the members who ultimately decide which rules
will officially be adopted.5 These rules include everything from recruiting and compliance, to
academics and championships.6 The NCAA national office consists of 500 employees located at
the Indianapolis headquarters whose job is to “interpret and support member legislation,” run
championships, and manage programs designed to benefit student athletes.7
The NCAA is composed of bylaws that are separated by division.8 Specifically, the
Division I manual, effective August 1, 2018, constitutes a 440-page manual of rules and
regulations.9 The bylaws are for all student athletes (those returning), and all new student athletes
(those signing the Student-Athlete Statement for the first time).10 The bylaws lay out of rules and
regulations for all student-athlete participation and conduct.11 Specifics of the bylaws include:
ethical conduct, amateurism, financial aid, academic standards, regulations concerning eligibility,
outside competition, transferring, recruitment, and more.12
The focus of this Note will surround Bylaw 14: Academic Eligibility. As a general
overview, a student-athlete is not permitted to compete in intercollegiate athletics competition
unless all applicable eligibility requirements are met.13 Specifically, this Note will discuss the
litigation surrounding Bylaw 14.5: Transfer Regulations. In general, “a student who transfers to a
member institution from any collegiate institution is required to complete one full academic year
of residence at the certifying institution before being eligible to compete for…the member
institution, unless the student…qualifies for an exception as set forth in this bylaw.”14
Additionally, a transfer student from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition at a member institution until the student has fulfilled a residence requirement of one

1

What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited
Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter What is the NCAA?]
2
Our Priorities, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
3
Membership, NCAA, http:// www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter
Membership].
4
Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-weare/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited Jan. 30. 2019).
[hereinafter Historical Outline]
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
What is the NCAA?, supra note 1.
8
Membership, supra note 3.
9
NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL: AUGUST 2018-19 (2018), https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4547-20182019-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version-available-august-2018.aspx [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL].
10
Id.
11
See generally id.
12
Id.
13
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.01.1
14
Id. at § 14.5.1
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full academic year at the certifying institution.15 The litigation surrounding this Note stems from
Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10: One-Time Transfer Exception. This bylaw states: “the student transfers to the
certifying institution from another four-year collegiate institution, and all of the following
conditions are met:
(a) The student is a participant in a sport other than baseball, basketball, bowl
subdivision football or men’s ice hockey at the institution to which the student is
transferring…16
(b) The student has not transferred previously from one four-year institution…17
(c) At the time of transfer to the certifying institution (see Bylaw 14.5.2), the student
would have been academically eligible had he or she remained at the institution
from which the student transferred…18
(d) If the student is transferring from an NCAA or NAIA member institution, the
student’s previous institution shall certify in writing that it has no objection to the
student being granted an exception to the transfer-residence requirement. If an
institution receives a written request for a release from a student-athlete, the
institution shall grant or deny the request within seven business days. If the
institution fails to respond to the student-athlete’s written request within seven
business days, the release shall be granted by default and the institution shall
provide a written release to the student-athlete.19
The purpose of this rule is to prevent student-athletes participating in revenue-generating
sports (basketball, football, baseball, and men’s hockey) from participating in NCAA competition
at a new Division I member institution without first completing a full academic year. The only
exception to this rule would be if a student athlete participating in one of these sports received a
waiver, as found from Bylaw 14.7. The Committee on Academics may waive academic and
general eligibility requirements under the following circumstances:
(a) For student-athletes in times of national emergency;
(b) For member institutions that have instituted a trimester or other accelerated
academic program, provided any member institution applying for a waiver shall
demonstrate a reasonable need for such waiver.20

15

Id. at § 14.5.5
“…A participant in championship subdivision football at the institution to which the student is transferring may
use this exception only if the participant transferred to the certifying institution from an institution that sponsors
bowl subdivision football and has two or more seasons of competition remaining in football or the participant
transfers from a Football Championship Subdivision institution that offers athletically related financial aid in
football to a Football Championship Subdivision institution that does not offer athletically related financial aid in
football;”
17
“…unless, in the previous transfer, the student-athlete received an exception per Bylaw 14.5.5.2.6
(discontinued/nonsponsored sport exception);”
18
“…except that he or she is not required to have fulfilled the necessary percentage-of-degree requirements at the
previous institution; and”
19
Id. at § 14.5.5.2.10(a)-(d)
20
Further, no waiver shall be granted that permits a student-athlete to compete in more than the maximum
permissible number of seasons of intercollegiate competition (see Bylaw 12.8). Under the waiver allowed, if a
student in an accelerated academic program completes the requirements for a degree before completing eligibility,
16
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(c) For institutions that have suffered extraordinary personnel losses from one or
more of their intercollegiate athletics teams due to accident or illness of a disastrous
nature21

This Note will discuss the litigation surrounding the current transfer process and analyze
the judicial holdings’ impact on all current student-athletes, regardless of sport. First, this Note
will begin with a brief background of the NCAA’s structural foundation and its divisional makeup.
It is important to understand that the current transfer restrictions apply to Division I student athletes
only. Next, it will shift into a case analysis regarding each pivotal case the NCAA has ever faced,
beginning in 1984. All challenges are brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and this Note will
discuss how an antitrust act made its way into college athletic bylaws. The ultimate conclusion is
that the whereas some NCAA bylaws may be subjected to Sherman antitrust scrutiny, the transfer
bylaws have, and will continue to, remain unaffected.
Moreover, this Note will discuss how the judicial holdings, in accordance with the NCAA
transfer bylaws, in fact, protect student athletes, instead of cause harm. If the transfer rule were to
be lifted, the current NCAA structure could be forever changed as we know, and that may not be
in the best interests of the student athletes. The NCAA transfer bylaw seeks to protect amateurism,
as continually held by the courts, which is exactly why the NCAA was created in the first place.
From there, this Note will discuss alternate options for student-athletes seeking to transfer across
Division I member institutions and the most recent reform the NCAA has taken in response to the
current call for action. Lastly, this Note will conclude with a finding that a college education is
priceless, and how the NCAA transfer regulations seek to protect that notion.
A. Background
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was formed in 1906 with the
purpose to create competition and eligibility rules for intercollegiate sports.22 In the 1905 season,
football was in danger of being abolished as it was deemed too dangerous. 23 During this season,
18 college and amateur players died during play.24 As a result, President Theodore Roosevelt
summoned thirteen football representatives to the White House to participate in meetings with the
focus on reform to improve safety.25 The NCAA was officially formed shortly thereafter on the
curtail of this safety agreement.26 From there, discussions transitioned into the preservation of
amateurism alongside the notion of allowing college athletes to obtain a scholarship in exchange
to represent the school in their respective sport.27

the student may participate in competition that begins within 90 days after completion of the requirements for the
degree; and
21
Id. at § 14.7.1(a)-(c)
22
National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-CollegiateAthletic-Association (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). [hereinafter
National Collegiate Athletic Association]
23
Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, Huffpost (Dec. 7. 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnnymanziel-ncaa-eligibility_b_3020985
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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Today, the NCAA serves as a general legislative and administrative authority for men’s
and women’s intercollegiate athletics.28 It creates and enforces the rules of play for every sport.29
It creates eligibility requirement for student athletes.30 It supervises not only national, but regional
intercollegiate athletic contests.31 It complies statistics on about a dozen college sports, including:
gridiron football, baseball, men’s and women’s basketball, soccer, ice hockey, and lacrosse. 32 It
publishes rule books and guides on each and every sport.33 In the early 21st century, NCAA
member institutions include more than 1,000 college and universities.34
Since 1973, the NCAA has structured into a multiclass organizational system; with the
three classes divided into Division I, Division II, and Division III athletics.35 These institutions
must meet minimum and maximum financial aid awards in each sport for their athletics
programs.36 The NCAA reorganization structure was approved in 1973 at the first Special
Convention for competition and legislative purposes.37 The President of the NCAA, at the time
Dr. Alan Chapman, said that “reorganization was vital to keep the association a valuable force in
athletics.”38 He felt that the organizations were drifting apart due to the vastly differing opinions
between the large and small schools.39 “No longer will the big guys be telling the little guys what
to do…”40 Whereas the divisions represent an organizational hierarchy, a Division II or Division
III institution may elect to participate in any one Division I sport.41 However, this is limited to any
sport that is not football or basketball.42
One of the main goals of the NCAA is to serve college student-athletes.43 They accomplish
this goal via academic services, opportunities and experiences, financial assistance, wellness and
insurance, and professional and personal development.44 No matter what division a student-athlete
may participate in, the NCAA serves to support and advance each and every individual.45
Specifically, more than eight in ten Division I student-athletes earn bachelor’s degrees.46 This
number constitutes their highest rate ever and higher than the general student body.47 If the judicial
system were to holding that any NCAA student athlete could transfer at any time, it could lead to
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-CollegiateAthletic-Association (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
36
Id.
37
Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-weare/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited Jan. 30. 2019).
[hereinafter Historical Outline]
38
Gordon S. White Jr. N.C.A.A. Reorganizes Into 3 Groups, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/07/archives/ncaa-reorganizes-into-3-groups-national-league-standing-of-the.html
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Historical Outline, supra note 20.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
47
Id.
29
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a situation where students would begin to transfer mid-semester. Credits may not necessarily
properly transfer across intuitions, forcing students to repeat classes or adding on an additional
semester. Before long, a student athlete could no longer be athletically eligible, have a semester
remaining, but no scholarship to cover the cost.
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act
Since 1984, every single lawsuit against the NCAA challenging the enforceability of its bylaws
has been brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Act”). The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890
stemming from the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 48 The Act
was originally enacted to facilitate competition and prevent monopolies in major industrial and
agricultural industries.49 Over time, the Sherman Act grew to ensure a competitive free market
system and has expanded over all differing types of industries in the United States. 50 Lawsuits
against the NCAA for violation of the Sherman Act have stemmed from Section 1:
“1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundered thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.”
In the context of the NCAA, the Sherman Act serves to promote and protect against
competition. In the realm of sports law, this Act has been the predominant mean applied to effect
change in NCAA sanctioned sports. The main issue surrounding each legal claim is whether the
actions of the NCAA violate the antitrust laws. As this Note will discuss, the NCAA transfer rule
will not be subjected to the Act’s antitrust scrutiny as it is exempt from such analysis. Therefore,
so long as an NCAA bylaw is presumptively competitive, it will been be seen as a protection of
amateurism.
II. Case Analysis
Since 1984, the NCAA has seen a handful of pivotal cases challenging the enforceability
of its bylaws. Whereas the judicial system has not upheld each and every single bylaw as
competitive, to withstand the Act’s scrutiny, it has deemed a narrow set of circumstances where
the NCAA is essentially untouchable. So long as the NCAA proves that their bylaws conform to
preserving the tradition of amateurism, it will withstand the Act.

48

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, http://economics.fundamentalfinance.com/sherman-act.php (February 2,
2019).
49
Id.
50
Id.

29

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1
A. 1984: The First Challenge to the NCAA

This was the year the Supreme Court came out with their decision regarding the first
Sherman Act challenge to the NCAA in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
and the University of Georgia Athletic Association51 Board of Regents was the first time the
NCAA had ever been attacked via antitrust liability. Whereas the Supreme Court ultimately ruled
the NCAA’s monopoly on football television broadcasting violated the Sherman Act 52, it was the
dicta of Justice Stevens that would go on to be cited in numerous future cases and leave a true
lasting impact that came to change the NCAA forever.
The relevant facts of the case are as follows. In 1981, the NCAA created a television plan
for the college football games of its member institutions for the 1982-1985 seasons.53 The intention
of the plan was to reduce the adverse effect of live television upon football game attendance. 54
This plan limited the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games and subsequently, the
number of games that any one college could televise.55 No member of the NCAA was permitted
to make any sales of television rights except in accordance with the plan.56 The NCAA contracted
with two outside television networks granting them each the right the telecast the live “exposures”
described in the plan. In return, each network agreed to pay a specified fee to the participating
NCAA members.57
Respondent members, as additionally part of the NCAA member-institutions, were
members of the College Football Association (CFA), which was created to promote the interests
of football colleges within the NCAA.58 The CFA had negotiated their own contract with a
different network that would have allowed more television appearances than the NCAA plan for
each college, and subsequently increased CFA revenues.59
In response, the NCAA warned they would take disciplinary action against any CFA
member that complied with their television plan.60 Respondents then commenced legal action in
the Federal District Court.61 The District Court held that the controls exercised by the NCAA over
television the college football games violation Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and
accordingly granted injunctive relief.62 The court found that competition in the live college football
television market had been restrained in three ways: (1) the NCAA fixed the price for particular
telecasts; (2) its exclusive network contracts were tantamount to a group boycott of all other
potential broadcasters and its threat of sanctions against its members constituted a threatened
boycott of potential competitors; and (3) its plan placed an artificial limit on the production of
televised college football.63

51

National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
See generally id.
53
Id. at 2995.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 2952.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 2957.
63
Id.
52
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The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court’s holding.64 They found that the Sherman
Act had been violated and the NCAA’s plan constituted “illegal per se price fixing” and that even
if it were not per se illegal, the anticompetitive limitation on output and price was justified by any
procompetitive defenses.65 In a 7-2 holding, authored by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals and directed them to vacate the District Court’s
injunction pending further proceedings in accordance with the substantial remaining authority of
the NCAA to regulate the telecasting of its member institutions’ football games.66
The Court found that the NCAA member institutions created an unreasonable type of
restraint via a horizontal agreement among members as the way in which they competed with one
another.67 It created an artificial limit on the amount of football games to be televised which created
a limitation on output.68 In addition, there was horizontal price fixing because the minimum
aggregate price precludes any price negotiations between institutions and broadcasters.69 As a
matter of law, this is considered to be “illegal per se” because these practices are anticompetitive.70
However, the Court did not use the “per se” approach in their analysis because this particular case
involves a specific industry where horizontal restraints are essential to be available in the first
place.71 Instead, the Court’s analysis falls under the Rule of Reason to determine the impact of
competitive conditions under the horizontal structure.72 Analysis under the Sherman Act in
accordance with the Rule of Reason does not change the ultimate inquiry focus as its purpose is to
analyze the competitive significance of the restraint.
Even under the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court still concluded that the NCAA’s
restraints on price and output had significant anticompetitive effects.73 As previously stated by the
District Court, if the member institutions were unrestrained from selling television rights, it was
determined that more games would be shown on television at a lower price.74 By the NCAA fixing
the price for television rights, it created a structure that was unreceptive to viewer demands.75 Not
to mention, since all member institutions needed NCAA approval, no member institution had a
real choice but to comply with the NCAA plan or face hefty sanctions.76 The combination of all
these points created an anticompetitive market where individual competitors essentially lost their
right to compete.
Whereas the Supreme Court ultimately held that the NCAA’s conduct violated the
Sherman Act as it represented an unreasonable restraint of trade, it is the dicta of the Court’s
holding that would resonate for years to come via their “twinkling of an eye” analysis discussed
in future litigation. The Court found that most of the regulatory NCAA controls are justifiable to
foster competition among amateur athletics, and “therefore procompetitive because they enhance
public interest in intercollegiate athletics,” while ultimately concluding that the NCAA television
plan is not in the same realm as “rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of
64

Id. at 2958.
Id.
66
See generally id.
67
Id. at 2958-59.
68
Id. at 2959.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See generally id.
72
See generally id.
73
Id. at 2959.
74
Id. at 2962.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2969.
65
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participants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise share the responsibilities and
the benefits of the total venture.”77 This would come to serve as extremely important language in
future litigation because Justice Stevens essentially paved the road for all future bylaws to be
exempt from Sherman Act anticompetitive liability.
In the last section of the opinion, Justice Stevens concludes that the NCAA plays a “critical
role” in the maintenance of tradition and amateurism in intercollegiate athletics, and that it needs
“ample latitude” to play that role.78 This vital language would come to serve as the pathway for
the NCAA to create and enforce any such type of bylaw of their choosing, so long as the output is
not restricted. Justice Stevens, along with six other members of the Supreme Court, felt that it was
the NCAA’s role to “preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”79
The NCAA was founded on the preservation of amateur athletics.80 This theory of
responsibility has allowed the Association to create a set of rules and twist them into whatever
form they deem fit. As long as amateurism is protected, and the bylaws are deemed procompetitive,
the NCAA has withstood any sort of scrutiny that has come its way.
B. The Difficulty of Proving an Anticompetitive Effect
The burden of proving that a given bylaw produces an anticompetitive effect on the stated
market rests with the plaintiff. As seen in Board of Regents, this is no easy feat to overcome. In
Agnew v. NCAA81 the plaintiffs failed to keep their claim alive past a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs, Agnew and Courtney, underwent similar undergraduate experiences regarding
athletic scholarship award receivals. Both were awarded scholarships for a year of education,
room, and board at no charge, in exchange for playing football at their respective colleges.82 After
the first year, both suffered serious injuries that prevented them from having their scholarships
renewed for the entirety of their degree progression.83 They jointly filed a lawsuit alleging their
failure to acquire a scholarship to the full cost of obtaining a Bachelor degree was a direct result
of the NCAA’s bylaws prohibiting specific member schools from offering multi-year scholarships,
or capping the number of athletic scholarships a school can offer for each team in a given year.84
In 2011, the District Court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss holding that the plaintiffs
failed to identify a cognizable market for which trade was improperly restrained, and even if done,
that those markets were not cognizable under the Sherman Act.85 The District Court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.86 Plaintiffs appealed this decision to dismiss its claims and its
decision to dismiss with prejudice.87
The Seventh Circuit began their opinion with reiterating that the NCAA bylaw analysis
must be done under the Rule of Reason, where the plaintiff carries the burden of showing the

77

Id.
Id. at 2970.
79
Id.
80
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 2978.
81
Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
82
Id. at 322.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 333.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
78
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anticompetitive effect on a given market.88 This court interprets Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of
Regents to mean that most NCAA regulations will be a “justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur teams,” and are therefore procompetitive.89 The Court considers these types of
regulations to have been “blessed by the Supreme Court” and therefore exempt from Sherman Act
liability.90 In the context of the case at hand, the Court finds that the regulations at issue are exactly
those types of regulations that Justice Stevens addressed in his Board of Regents opinion.91 For the
preceding reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s
claims with prejudice.92
As demonstrated by Agnew, if bylaws surrounding athletic scholarship renewals will not
sustain Sherman Antitrust Act scrutiny, what will? Whereas the Agnew court felt they conformed
in accordance with Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of Regents, the following Ninth Circuit court
case opened the pathway to the future of NCAA bylaws and questioned whether, in totality, they
are actually procompetitive in nature.
C. How to Obtain Any Relief
At the time, O’Bannon v. NCAA93 was seen as a ground-breaking case for Sherman
Antitrust Act challenges towards the NCAA. It gave a sense of hope for student athletes who felt
harmed and seemed to open the pathway for future litigation challenges.
Plaintiff, Ed O’Bannon was a former All-American basketball player at UCLA.94 One day
in 2008, he was at a friend’s house where he was informed by the friend’s son that he had been
depicted in a college basketball video game produced by Electronic Arts (“EA”). 95 In the game,
the avatar that O’Bannon saw was a virtual depiction of himself and wore his same jersey
number.96 O’Bannon never agreed to have EA use his likeness for the video game and received
zero compensation for it.97 In 2009, O’Bannon sued the NCAA and Collegiate Licensing Company
(“CLC”) on the ground that the NCAA’s amateurism rules prevented himself, and other studentathletes, from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likeness (“NILs”).98
After a fourteen-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgement for O’Bannon,
holding that the NCAA disallowing student athlete’s to be compensated for their NILs violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.99 The Court applied the Rule of Reason to analyze the legality of
the challenged NCAA rules and found they posed an anticompetitive effect in the college education
market.100 These rules allow colleges and universities to value a player’s NILs at zero, effectively
colluding to fix the price.101 However, when applying the second step of the Rule of Reason, the

88

Id. at 335.
Id. at 339.
90
Id. at 341.
91
See generally id.
92
Id. at 328.
93
O’Bannon v. National College Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
94
Id. at 1055.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1056.
100
Id. at 1057.
101
Id. at 1058.
89

33

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1

Court found amateurism serves two procompetitive purpose.102 The first, integrating academics
and athletics to “improve the quality of educational services” provided, and second by promoting
the understanding of amateurism, to help preserve consumer demand for college sports. 103 In the
third and final prong in the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court considered whether there were
means of achieving the NCAA’s procompetitive purposes that were “substantially less restrictive”
than a total ban on compensating student athletes for the usage of their NILs.104 To this point, the
District Court found that student athletes could be paid by their institutions up to the cost of
attendance, and up to $5,000 per year to be put in a trust and paid when they leave school.105
The Ninth Circuit begins by discussing the Board of Regents dicta regarding amateurism.
In O’Bannon, the NCAA makes the argument that amateurism is exempt from Sherman Act
liability and cite the Board of Regents.106 However, the Ninth Circuit disagrees with this
contention, in that Board of Regents did not exempt amateurism from liability, it was only offered
a deference of Rule of Reason analysis because the nature (“character and quality”) of the NCAA
requires a less strict scrutiny; but is by no means exempt. The Court deems that the validity of
amateurism rules must be “proved, not presumed.”107
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit vacates the lower court’s holding an injunction requiring the
NCAA to allow their member institutions to compensate student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in
deferred compensation.108 They found that the District Court ignored the fact that not paying
student athletes is “precisely what makes them amateurs,” which is an integral factor to the NCAA
market.109 The Ninth Circuit otherwise affirmed the lower court’s holding.110
Whereas the O’Bannon holding did not quite provide the relief various student athletes
have desperately been seeking, it opened the pathway to for future litigation that NCAA bylaws
are not automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny, and a proper analysis must be performed
before any bylaw can be deemed procompetitive under the NCAA model.
III. Transfer Challenges to the NCAA
In search for a new means to challenge the NCAA bylaws as anticompetitive under the
Sherman Act, three separate lawsuits were violated between November 2015 and November 2016.
Each were class-action lawsuits challenging the NCAA transfer bylaw, all filed by the same firm:
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. Each complaint alleges that the Year in Residence Rule acts
as an illegal restrain on trade under the Sherman Act. Two of the three lawsuits have been litigated,
with one having reached a Seventh Circuit opinion in summer 2018. Both of which, the courts
ruled in favor of the NCAA. The last case was awaiting the Seventh Circuit decision before taking
further action.

102

Id. at 1059.
Id.
104
Id. at 1060.
105
Id. at 1061.
106
See generally id.
107
Id. at 1063.
108
Id. at 1079.
109
Id.
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Id.
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A. Initiation of the Year-In-Transfer Bylaw Movement

As harm-felt student athletes watched their fellow colleagues rise and fall in the judicial
system, a particular law firm saw a hole in the movement. Transfer bylaws had never been brought
to the courts under Sherman Antitrust Act liability, and the issue was ripe for hearing. Although
all lawsuits were filed between 2015 and 2016, the transfer issue had been going on long before
Hagens Berman filed its first suit in Pugh v. NCAA.111
In 2010, Pugh accepted a full ride scholarship to a Division I FCS school, Weber State
University, on the promise by head coach, Ron McBride, that his scholarship would be renewed
annually as long as he did well academically and remained eligible for NCAA competition.112 In
December 2011, Coach McBride retired and the new head coach, Jody Sears, informed Pugh that
Weber state would not be renewing his scholarship and he should look into transferring. 113 Pugh
had offers from multiple D1 schools, so long as he would apply and be granted a NCAA “hardship
waiver” allowing him to play immediately.114 The NCAA ultimately denied his request and every
scholarship offer Pugh received was rescinded.115 In 2013, Pugh transferred to a Division II school
where he was eligible to compete immediately.116 His scholarship was not a full ride, causing Pugh
to have to take out loans.117
In his lawsuit against the NCAA, Pugh argues that the NCAA transfer bylaws violate the
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade, specifically focusing on the “year in residence”
requirement.118
The Court focuses on the Supreme Court opinion of Board of Regents and the Seventh
Circuit opinion of Agnew, to frame their decision in granting the NCAA’s motion to dismiss on
Count II regarding the year-in-residence bylaw. When analyzing Pugh’s motion to dismiss, the
Court focuses on whether the transfer rule is deemed “presumptively procompetitive” or not. 119
The transfer bylaw directly relates to eligibility, to which the Court held that “the law is clear” and
NCAA eligibility bylaws, in accordance with Board of Regents, is presumptively procompetitive
and therefore, does not violate the Sherman Act.120
Pugh argues that the transfer bylaw does not involve a challenge affecting eligibility, but
instead, the distribution of scholarships, to which the Court found unpersuasive.121 Additionally,
the court found Pugh’s second argument that he was economically harmed by having to take a
diminished scholarship at his new school to also be unconvincing.122 Even if the court decided to
view Pugh’s harm as a commercial challenge, the Court would nonetheless be required to examine
the NCAA’s activities, instead of Pugh’s. Since it is the duty of the NCAA to maintain a tradition
of amateurism in college sports, the court is required to give them “ample latitude”123
Pugh v. National College Athletic Ass’n, 2016 U.D. Dist. WL 5394408.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana chose to conform their
opinion directly within the decisions in Agnew and Board of Regents, and not to conduct any
additional thought or analysis.
B. Try, and Try Again
Shortly after attorney Hagens Berman filed the Pugh lawsuit, he filed another suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana124 with the exact same issue in
Deppe v. NCAA125 Deppe was recruited to play football as a punter by six different Division I
universities, and ultimately chose Northern Illinois University (“NIU”) where he enrolled in June
2014 as a preferred walk-on. Deppe “red shirted” his first year, meaning he chose to forego one
year of athletic eligibility, to carry over to a later year.126 He planned to start the following year as
the team’s punter and then have four years of athletic eligibility remaining. 127 He was told by the
special team’s coach that he would be receiving an athletic scholarship in January 2015. 128
However, that coach left NIU prior to September 2015, when Deppe received office letters of
release.129
Deppe then began recruiting with other schools immediately.130 He visited the University
of Iowa (“Iowa”), and during his visit, the coaching staff told him they wanted him if he would be
eligible for the 2016/17 season, via a hardship waiver.131 In November 2015, Iowa accepted Deppe
into their institution for admission.132 However, days later, the Iowa coach informed Deppe that
their program had decided to pursue another punter who had immediate academic eligibility,
instead of pursuing an NCAA waiver.133 Deppe’s attorneys contact the NCAA inquiring if he could
still receive a waiver given the circumstances but was ultimately denied because only the transfer
institution can request a waiver in accordance with NCAA rules.134
Deppe filed a complaint with this Court claiming that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act
by (1) limiting the number of Division I football scholarships that a member institution can grant
in a given year; and (2) promulgating a “year-in-residency” bylaw that (with exceptions) requires
Division I student athletes to forego a year of athletic eligibility when they transfer to another
Division I school.135 His second count alleges that the transfer bylaws also violate the transfer
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restrain on trade.136
The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirms the District Court’s holding that the year-inresidence rule is a presumptively procompetitive eligibility in accordance with Agnew and Board
of Regents, and found a full Rule of Reason analysis to be unnecessary.137 A procompetitive
presumption will not be warranted if a regulation does not preserve a tradition of amateurism. The
124
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Seventh Circuit cites to Board of Regents explanation that most, if not all, NCAA eligibility rules
will within the presumption of pro-competitiveness.138 Deppe argues that the year-in-residence
rule does not fit within traditional eligibility bylaws; however, the Court disagrees and holds that
the rule “falls neatly in line” with other rules previous courts have characterized as eligibility
rules.139
Deppe next makes the argument that the NCAA enforces the transfer rule for economic
reasons and not to preserve the product of college football.140 In shaping this argument, he notes
that the transfer exception is unavailable to revenue-generating sports within the NCAA.141
However, the Court explains that Deppe ignores the fact that these are “precisely the athletes who
are most vulnerable to poaching,” and lifting these restrictions would allow institutions to
essentially trade these student athletes like professional athletes.142
In the second part of this argument, Deppe contends administrative costs like recruiting
and retention expenditures are lowered by impeding the transfer schools.143 He states that member
institutions are essentially saving money that they would otherwise need to spend on larger
scholarships to tempt their student-athletes to stay, as long as additional funds necessary to recruit
and train new players to replace the ones that leave.144 The Court shuts down this argument finding
that saving money as a consequence of an eligibility bylaw does not correlate to the presumption
that such bylaw is “fundamentally aimed at containing costs” ahead of preserving amateurism in
such sports.145
The last economic argument that Deppe makes is that the year-in-residence rule “preserves
the hegemony of the ‘Power 5’ conferences.”146 He makes the assertion that these schools recruit
the most talented high-school athletes and the transfer rule prevents those athletes from transferring
to less powerful schools.147 The Court strikes this notion down because it believes that the rule
impedes transfer in both directions because without the rule, the Power 5 schools could poach
athletes from smaller schools, which would “risk eroding the amateur character of college
games.”148
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found the year-in-transfer rule presumptively
procompetitive on its face in accordance with Agnew and Board of Regents, forwent a full Rule of
Reason analysis, and held that Deppe’s challenge of the NCAA year-in-residence bylaw under the
Sherman Act failed on the pleadings.
C. Accept Defeat and Re-Strategize
The third, and final, lawsuit filed in federal court was by plaintiff, Johnnie Vassar
(“Vassar”).149 Vassar is a former men’s basketball player at Northwestern University who filed a
138
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class-action lawsuit against Northwestern and the NCAA alleging that the two collaborated to “run
him off” the team to free up his scholarship for another player.150 According to his complaint filed
in the Northern District of Illinois, he alleges that Northwestern put him on an internship to work
as a janitor and that head coach, Chris Collins, “berated” him and told him that he had no future
with the team.151 Collins had no comment to the Northwestern daily newspaper, only stating that
he would “let those things be handled behind closed doors.”152
According to the complaint, Vassar was placed in an internship in attempt to get him to
give up his athletic scholarship.153 He was required to report at 7 a.m. multiple days per week
picking up trash and leaves, operating a leaf blower, wiping down tennis court bleachers and
baseball diamonds, and to life heavy metal planks near the football field.154 To make matters worse,
the complaint alleges that Northwestern attempted to falsify his timecards attempting to prove
misconduct on Vassar’s part.155
In 2016, Vassar was allegedly (informally) asked in March 2016 if he would take a cash
payment that was to be equal to the remainder value of his current scholarship.156 Following, he
voiced concerns over the NCAA rules and was then asked if he would be willing to accept an equal
scholarship based off of merit.157 One month later, Vasser was notified that the University would
be revoking his scholarship.158
The class-action lawsuit, like the others, alleges that the NCAA violated the Sherman
antitrust law by requiring student-athletes to sit out for one year after transferring to another
institution.159 While Vassar remained a student at Northwestern, he reached out to multiple
Division I basketball programs inquiring about transferring but was ultimately informed that he
would not be accepted unless he could play immediately.160 University spokesman Al Cubbage
told the school newspaper, via email, that he believed the claim had no legal merit, and that he
would “vigorously” defend the University.161
Vasser chose to await the summer 2018 Deppe decision in the Seventh Circuit before
deciding whether he intended to further along the litigation process. 162 Following the decision, in
August 2018, Vasser dropped his suit from federal court and re-filed a similar version of the
lawsuit in Cook County circuit court, now solely against the University. 163 Prior to the Deppe
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decision, the judge presiding over the Vassar case had repeatedly continued the NCAA’s motion
to dismiss.164 According to Vassar’s legal counsel, the choice to withdraw the lawsuit surrounded
the fact that “the appeal was unlikely to survive.”165 Vassar graduated from Northwestern and has
since enrolled as a graduate program at Tennessee Tech and plays on the men’s Division 1
basketball team.166 In accordance with the NCAA bylaws, graduate students do not have to sit out
one year before becoming eligible.167
In the original federal lawsuit, Vassar alleges that he was “berated” by Coach Collins and
placed in an “internship” that entailed manual labor.168 The new re-filed lawsuit in Cook County
court, alleges the exact same facts and description of events, but presents nine causes of action
instead of four.169 Vassar’s lawyers stated that the additional state law complaints include claims
such as ‘Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,’ and ‘Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress,” that were not applicable in the federal court system. 170 Northwestern’s legal counsel
stated that the University will comply with the court rules and procedures, and “will defend those
claims aggressively” because he believes they are without merit.171 In accordance with the Cook
County civil suit docket, as of March 2018, the case has yet to be set for trial.172
IV. Analysis
In light of the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Deppe, one must ask: did the Court get it
right? As a matter of public policy, do we, as a society, want to prevent willing and able studentathletes in revenue-general to be able to freely transfer across member institutions? On the one
hand, why should these individuals be prohibited from doing as they please? However, on the
other, are there greater repercussions at stake if such a transfer would be allowed? Is it really about
protecting amateurism? The answers to these questions will never be found in the judicial system.
The next step is to face the harsh reality and accept that the judicial system has placed its
proverbial foot down and put the transfer issue to rest once and for all. They have made it crystal
clear that so long as the NCAA bylaws seek to protect amateurism, they will be subjected to Rule
of Reason analysis, and found to be competitive and not in violation of the Sherman Act. Like
Vasser, those feeling incomplete by this decision have the option to seek alternate damages in state
court, if applicable, or look to the current change happening in the NCAA for relief.
It is easy to make the argument that the year-in-transfer bylaw should be outlawed, and the
NCAA should restructure their bylaws to be more student-athlete friendly and allow athletes to
freely transfer whenever they choose. However, the better argument is that the year-in-transfer
bylaw serves a dual purpose on both sides of the spectrum. First, the NCAA and member
institutions win because this rule ensures that athletes cannot jump from conference to conference,
dropped-in-federal-court-re-filed-against-northwestern-in-state-court/ [hereinafter Johnnie Vassar’s Lawsuit
Dropped].
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.6.1
168
Vassar Complaint at 32.
169
Johnnie Vassar’s Lawsuit Dropped, supra note 163.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
“CASE CONTINUED FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE – ALLOWED” Vassar v. Northwestern
University, No. 2018-L-008685 (Ill. Cir. Ct. April 4, 2019).

39

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1

hindering large TV contracts and conference cash flow. Second, it protects what is most important
at the end of the day: the value of a college degree. Student-athletes make the decision to attend
college for the purpose of obtaining a degree, with athletics serving as a means to an end within a
co-dependent relationship.
There is no doubt that certain athletic situations put a student-athlete in a position where
they no longer feel that their current program best suits their needs, but recent litigation
surrounding this exact issue has made an impact on the NCAA and forced them to alter their
transfer process for the better. This next section will discuss how the year-in-transfer bylaw
financially serves the NCAA and member institutions, and transitions into how the transfer process
has been reformed for the better. Lastly, this section will conclude with how recent litigation,
combined with NCAA reform, ultimately ensures that student-athletes are protected and will be
set up to graduate with success.
A. At the End of the Day, It’s All About the Money
It comes as no surprise that the majority of NCAA revenue comes from the Division 1
men’s basketball television and marketing rights.173 In 2017, the NCAA made $1 billion in revenue
from “media rights fees, ticket sales, corporate sponsorships, and a proliferation of television ads”
surrounding the March tournament.174 The remainder revenue comes from championship ticket
sales, and other small variety of sources, such as membership dues. From there, $164.7 million is
distributed amongst Division 1 conferences via a “Division 1 Basketball Performance Fund,” (the
Fund) based on their performance in the men’s basketball tournament over a six-year rolling
period.175 Then, that money is distributed further down to fund individual sports and provide
additional athletic scholarships.176 This would be impossible without the student-athlete.
If a student-athlete in a revenue-generating sport, specifically men’s basketball, were able
to transfer at any time without having to miss one game, television contracts would be adversely
affected. Sporting networks would be unable to make firm deals with conferences as they would
have no assurance on a conference’s popularity. Conferences athletic ability would be fluid,
therefore, resulting in lower-costing television contracts for a shorter amount of time. Since the
money that comes from the Fund is distributed by conference, it would be impossible to accurately
allocate the money across conferences if athletes were able to transfer mid-season. Conferences
would be constantly changing, and it would become more difficult to accurately measure
distribution from the Fund.
The NCAA encourages conferences to divide their money equally among the members.177
This is easier for larger conferences to do as they have other sources of income. 178 However,
smaller conferences count on this NCAA money to cover their own expenses.179 It is only the
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leftover money that actually gets distributed to the conference members.180 Most universities do
not even make money on their basketball programs, and only about one-third will break even.181
Therefore, by allowing players to actively transfer schools, and across conferences, it shrinks the
pot of money that gets distributed to each institution.
Less money per institution, means less money per athlete. There is an illustrious hype about
the “glamorous” student-athlete life: the free trips, free meals, free clothing. However, none of this
would be possible without those student-athletes in revenue-generating sports. Not to mention,
most student athletes who are not participants of a revenue-generating sports, do not lead
glamorous lives to say the least. They practice 40+ hours per week 182 and compete just as
frequently, if not more, than those participating in a revenue-generating sport, with far less of a
budget. The second that conferences are making less money, is the same second that the studentathletes at the bottom of the totem pole will suffer. It may begin with less clothing, no big deal.
However, in the next minute it could mean not being able to afford travel to competition, or less
money per meal while on the road. In the blink of an eye, student-athletes will second guess
whether they actually want to subject themselves to such a lifestyle, and college athletics as we
know it will be transformed forever.
Everyone views the NCAA as a money-grubbing institution that squeezes everything they
can out of an athlete to make a profit.183 However, student-athletes choose this life. They choose
to commit four (or more) years to an institution, to serve a greater purpose. This relationship is codependent as after this time is up, they walk out of the door with a college degree. The more money
that the NCAA makes is more money than gets allocated to the student-athlete, especially those
athletes whose sports sit at the bottom of the totem pole. By allowing athletes to get up and change
institutions at any point, would result in less money per conference, and subsequently, less money
per athlete.
B. Changes to the Transfer Process
Under the previous transfer regime, a student-athlete must first notify his or her school
prior to transferring.184 From there, the school may block the student-athlete from having any
contact with any or all other schools.185 Specifically, big time basketball and football programs
sought to block their student-athletes from contact with other conference institutions.186 As of June
2018, the NCAA Division 1 counsel approved a proposal that switched the transferring profess to
a “notification-of-transfer” system in order to bring transparency and open conversation.187
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Beginning in October 2018, student-athletes finally obtained the ability to transfer without asking
for permission.188
Under this new system, once the student-athlete informs his or her school of their desire to
transfer, the school is then required to enter that student’s name into a national transfer database
within two business days.189 Once in the database, other coaches are free to contact that particular
individual.190 This rule change prevents the practice of coaches and/or administrators from
preventing student-athletes from having contact with specific schools. However, conferences still
maintain the ability to make rules that may be more restrictive than the national rule.191 Tampering
with a student-athlete’s transfer is no considered a “significant breach of conduct,” Level 2
violation.192 This rule change officially took effect on October 15, 2018.193 According to the
NCAA, the Transfer Working Group is still continuing to work on other transfer issues and is “still
exploring the possibility” of uniform transfer rules.194
Although this rule change may not be the solution every transferee seeks, it is one step in
the right direction. It means that the NCAA acknowledges that there is a very real problem in
practice and is taking active steps to right the wrong. Hopefully this rule will discourage shady
recruiting and coaching practices, and force universities to incentivize their student-athletes to
remain at their institution until graduation.
C. Reform in Action
The 2018 high-profile reform to the transfer bylaws made major strides for student-athletes,
falling short of creating a “free agency” in college sports.195 The new transfer profess can be seen
as a modification, and ultimately, a compromise, clearing the way for a smoother transition
between universities and maybe ultimately paving the way for immediate competition
eligibility.196
According to NCAA vice President, Dave Schnase, “the membership wanted to put
immediate eligibility back on the table,” with the circumstances of each individual case essentially
dictating the approval rate.197 Immediate eligibility for all transfers was allegedly considered, but
ultimately not included in the reform.198 Before the change, immediate undergraduate eligibility
was only granted when a school could show “extremely egregious behavior” by the previous
school.199 Other than that, all the NCAA could do was tack on an additional year of eligibility at
the end of a college career.200 Now, a request for immediate eligibility can be granted if the transfer
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was “due to documented mitigating circumstances that are outside the student-athlete’s control
and directly impact [their] health, safety, and well-being.”201
Michigan quarterback, Shea Patterson, is the first well-publicized case to undergo the new
guidelines, as he transferred to Michigan after Mississippi received NCAA sanctions.202 Patterson
alleges that he and his teammates were misled about the scope of an NCAA investigation into Ole
Miss, and the Revels’ bowl ban fell under the mitigating circumstances category. 203 He worked
with attorney Tom Mars on his waiver, who believes the waiver change seems to have been a
positive step in the right direction by the NCAA.204 Mars believes that this new rule allowing
mitigating circumstances instead of egregious behavior has encouraged universities to settle
matters without the previous institution having to admit any type of wrongdoing.205 He believes it
to be a more collaborative approach surrounding waiver requests, resulting in more positive
outcomes for student-athletes.206
Mars has also worked with quarterback transfer, Justin Fields, who was the victim of
several racial slurs directed at him during a game in October while he was playing for Georgia.207
Fields made the argument that he feared for his own well-being as a student-athlete, which is a
mitigating circumstance outside of his control.208 However, in general, the NCAA and member
institutions do not publicly explain waiver decisions citing to student privacy laws.209
D. Statistical Analysis
Between April 1 and November 9, 2018, the transfer waiver approval rate was 66% across
all sports.210 This was down from the 2017-18 school year, which was at 83%.211 However, waivers
requested before April 1, 2018, included those that requested an extra year of eligibility, not just
the immediate eligibility option.212
NCAA Division 1 data since the change is as follows: 63 of football players requested
waivers and 50 were approved, at 79%; and 55 men’s basketball players requested waivers and 33
were approved, at 60%.213 Patterson and Fields were not the only highly publicized players granted
waivers for immediate eligibility.214 Other cases drew attention as well, including Demetris
Robertson, who is a receiver from California allowed to play immediately at Georgia, and Antonio
Williams, who is a running back transferring from Ohio State to North Carolina.215 Whereas more
201

Id.
Id.
203
Dennis Dodd, Shea Patterson details scope of Ole Miss deception in lengthy letter to Michigan, CBS Sports
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/shea-patterson-details-scope-of-ole-miss-deception-in-lengthyletter-to-michigan/ (last visited March 20, 2019).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Brad Crawford, Why Justin Fields may get immediate NCAA transfer eligibility,
https://247sports.com/Article/Justin-Fields-Georgia-Bulldogs-transfer-NCAA-Ohio-State-126527630/ (last visited
March 20, 2019).
208
Id.
209
Revamped NCAA, supra note 195.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See generally id.
215
Id.
202

43

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1

requests for immediate eligibility have been granted, since each request is different, it is too soon
and too difficult to determine whether the reform can be deemed a success or not as of yet.
E. Alternate Waivers and Exceptions
Whereas the judicial system has made it clear the NCAA is the master of their bylaws,
without wiggle room, student-athletes should always look for alternate means to seek immediate
eligibility. The one-time exception is the most commonly used exception for transfers from one
four-year Division 1 university to another.216 A student-athlete should always look for another
transfer exception to use. However, although such an exception may have fewer requirements, it
may not always be the better option. As discussed above, all three plaintiffs would not have had
any issue transferring had they been granted waivers, and thereafter would have been able to
continue to pursue a college degree via a collegiate sporting career. The various additional waivers
and exceptions include: graduate exception, graduate transfer waiver, discontinued academic
program exception, military service exception, discontinued/non-sponsored sport exception, twoyear non-participation/minimal participation exception, return to original institution without
participation or with minimal participation exception, and non-recruited student exception.217
The most controversial exception to the year-in-transfer rule is the family hardship
waiver.218 Student-athletes participating in basketball and football programs that are granted this
waiver, are except from the year-in-transfer rule and are eligible to play their sport immediately.219
However, the reason this waiver is so controversial is that whether one is granted or denied is
extremely inconsistent.220 To be eligible for this transfer, the student-athlete must make the
argument that the best thing for the athlete and his or her family, is to allow the athlete to play
immediately and that the athlete needs this transfer to assist with an injured or ill family member.221
In accordance, the NCAA measures three areas: (1) the nature of the injury or illness; (2) the
student-athlete’s responsibilities related to the care of the family member; and (3) the chronology
of events.222
First, the injury or illness alleged must be life threatening and must involve and immediate
family member.223 Waivers will typically be denied if involving an extended family member, such
as an aunt/uncle, or grandparent; unless it can be proved that the particular family member raised
the student-athlete.224 Second, the more involved the student athlete is with the day-to-day care for
that immediate family member, the more likely it is that the waiver will be granted. 225 Last, there
must be something that changed to have prompted the student-athletes transfer.226 Examples
include a diagnosis, the actual injury, or a worsening condition.227 Waivers are much less likely to
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be granted if a family member has been ill or injured for a while, or if nothing has changed that
requires the student-athlete to transfer.228
The university must request the waiver and must submit at least three sets of information
coming from the student-athlete/family: (1) documentation from the doctor who diagnosed the
injured or ill family member; (2) documentation from the doctor currently treating the family
member; and (3) a letter from the student-athlete explaining the need for a waiver.229
Additional examples include: (applied to any sport) a student-athlete may transfer and play
immediately, if their academic program was discontinued and they enroll in the same major that
they were studying at the previous institution.230 A student-athlete may also transfer and play
immediately if he or she was not recruited in accordance with the NCAA, never received an athletic
scholarship, and did not practice or compete other than a tryout.231 Lastly, a student-athlete may
transfer and play immediately if the previous school publicly announced that it will drop the
student-athlete’s sport, will reclassify to another division, or the school never sponsored the
student-athlete’s sport.232 Unfortunately, most of these exceptions and waivers are applied to
extreme and unlikely circumstances.233
F. The Bottom Line
Since its birth, the NCAA has virtually been able to act however it wants and has withstood
countless protection from the judicial system under the blanket of “preserving amateurism.”
However, at the end of the day, student-athletes need to be prepared for a life after college, and by
the courts upholding the year-in-residence rule, it creates a lasting impact affecting more than just
any particular plaintiff. By not allowing student athletes from revenue-generating sports to freely
transfer, or be traded like a professional athlete, it protects the entirety of their education.
In Division 1 athletes there are approximately 179,200 student-athletes across 351 NCAA
member institutions.234 59% of all student-athletes will received some type of scholarship or
academic aid during their athletic tenure.235 In 2017, the graduation success rate was 87%. Fewer
than 2% of NCAA student-athletes will go on to be a professional athlete.236 The fact is, most
student-athletes depend on their academics to prepare them for the harsh reality that is life after
college. Not only is an education important, it is absolutely vital. The courts want to preserve
amateurism and protect student-athletes from being free trade. Some may ask: what is actually
being protected if student-athletes cannot move around at their own will? The answer: their
education.
Officially, in season practice is restricted to 20 hours per week (or four hours per day) in
accordance with NCAA rules.237 However, many student-athletes have reported that they spend at
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least 30 hours per week practicing, with up to 40 hours including weekly practice commitments;
according to a 2011 NCAA survey cited in the UNC lawsuit.238 The 20-hour per week rule may
be what the NCAA officially purports to follow but is not what is actually seen in practice. Studentled workouts do not count towards the 20 hours, neither do administrative meetings, film study,
athletic training and rehab, nor any other “activity” where a coach is not present. Game days count
as three hours, but some competitions extend far beyond the three-hour mark.239 For example,
track and field meets can last up to eight hours in one particular day, with meets lasting for two or
three days.
This begs the question: what is the NCAA doing for student-athlete education and career
development? Bylaw 16.3 covers “Academic and Other Support Services” with approximately
three sub-sections.240 16.3.1, titled “Mandatory,” outlines general academic counseling and
tutoring services available to all student-athletes.241 However, such services “may be provided” in
athletic departments but are not required.242 If the NCAA valued the “student” portion as much as
the “athletic” portion of the name, then these services would be mandatory. The NCAA needs to
prove that they value the student-athlete as a whole. The NCAA should require that athletes
mandatorily check in with their advisors for academic counseling and support, especially when an
athlete is in season. The student-athlete is serving the institution through athletic participation and
competition; therefore, the institution should be serving the student right back.
The NCAA brags via a 2016 Gallup study that interviewed 1,670 former student-athletes
about their college experiences and currently well-being, that former student-athletes rated higher
than 23,000 non-student-athletes graduating from the same institutions.243 Five elements were
measured: purpose, social, community, physical well-being, and financial-well-being.244 Of those
give, former student-athletes rated higher in all except financial well-being, where former studentathletes were thriving at similar levels in comparison to non-student-athlete peers.245 Among these
statistics, women stood out versus non-student athletes in employment rate and workplace
engagement.246 Additionally, men who played football or basketball scored higher in purpose and
community well-being.247 While these numbers appear promising, it must be noted that career
services are not required by the NCAA.248 Considering there are upwards for 200,000249 Division
I student-athletes alone, per year, these numbers from the Gallup poll must be taken with a grain
of salt.
Given these facts, what the NCAA does do right is prevent student athletes in revenuegenerating sports from freely transferring without having to sit out one year. Valuing education is
likely not the reason why this rule is in place, although the court system claims it is protecting
student athletes from free trade, this bylaw does serve a useful purpose. If student athletes did not
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have to sit out a year, they would be free to transfer at any point. This “any point” could mean
mid-semester. Basketball players would be enticed to transfer around mid-March right before the
NCAA tournament to a team that they feel is more likely to win. The repercussion of this transfer
would be a total and complete hindering of the student-athlete’s education. Transferring can be
difficult and stressful in and of itself, but breaking up an education has a lasting impact that could
negatively affect their future. How would credits properly transfer over? What if credits were
missed due to the new school’s academic policies? This could result in a student athlete having to
tack on an additional semester to graduate resulting in the loss of a potential job opportunity postgraduation.
V. Conclusion
The long, anticipated wait from the 7th Circuit holding is over. The NCAA year-in-transfer
bylaw will continue to be upheld by the courts in an effort to preserve amateurism. What does this
mean for future student athletes looking to transfer from their current schools? First, it means
current high school athletes seeking to play in a Division 1 revenue generating sport should make
a careful and cautious decision. Recruiting techniques have been exposed and serve to educate the
youth on what they may be getting into when deciding what institution to attend. As for current
student-athletes, this ruling means that they need to pursue alternate transfer means. With hardship
waivers being seemingly easier to attain, if a student-athlete truly feels there are “mitigating
circumstances” preventing them from staying at their school, they can pursue a waiver to play their
sport. At the end of the day, college athletics serve as a means to an end: a college degree.
Preserving the NCAA transfer rule will have a lasting impact on student athletes, it protects them
from being bounced around like a professional athlete, and allow them to obtain a unhindered
college education while simultaneously competing in a sport they love.

